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Kari Möttölä (Helsinki)
Military cooperation, transatlantic relations
and military non-alliance – a conceptual
analysis with a focus on the cases of Finland
and Sweden
Der Artikel behandelt die Teilnahme militärisch bündnisfreier Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen
Union – mit Finnland und Schweden als Fallbeispielen – an der im Entstehen begriffenen
internationalen militärischen Kooperation in Europa. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird dabei den
Implikationen von Bündnisfreiheit für ihre Rolle in den transatlantischen Beziehungen geschenkt.
Finnlands und Schwedens Beziehungen zur NATO im Rahmen der Partnerschaft für den Frieden
(PfP) folgt der Logik institutionalistischer Trends in der Theorie und Praxis internationaler
Beziehungen. Im Zuge der NATO-Erweiterung in der Region sind die beiden Staaten mit Machtpolitik
konfrontiert, wobei die Option ihrer eigenen Mitgliedschaft durch politische und Identitätsfaktoren
bestimmt wird. Durch ihre aktive Rolle im Rahmen der Europäischen Sicherheits- und
Verteidigungspolitik (ESDP) der EU sind Finnland und Schweden Teil des Mainstreams der Union.
Sie lassen sich dabei von pragmatischen Zielen der Entwicklung einer autonomen Handlungsfähigkeit
der EU in Kooperation mit der NATO leiten, wobei sie die Autonomie der Entscheidungsfindung der
Union als Basis weiterer Integration zu verteidigen suchen. Dadurch verfolgen die beiden Staaten
dezidiert europäische politische Ziele, die in zunehmendem Maße von den Zielen der USA in Bezug
auf Themen der globalen Sicherheit abweichen können. In Zukunft werden die Gemeinsame Außen-
und Sicherheitspolitik sowie die ESDP die effektivsten Mittel Finnlands und Schwedens zur
Beeinflussung der transatlantischen Beziehungen sein.
1. Introduction: military cooperation and
its implications for European security
Military cooperation has an enlarging and
growing role in the transformation of the Euro-
pean security order that has entered the second
post-Cold War decade. At the same time, the
interaction over a wide scope of military and
defence issues has become a key challenge for
the foreign and security policies of states as ac-
tors in the unification of Europe. Defence poli-
cies and military doctrines, adapted to the re-
quirements and possibilities in the security and
integration environment, are shaping the secu-
rity order as its essential elements.1
The nature and substance of international
military cooperation has changed over the past
decade. A complex array of internal and local
conflicts and disputes have emerged as security
risks and challenges that concern not only the
direct parties but also other states concerned
about such spill-over effects as the spread of
political instability, the danger of escalation and
the regression of transition and integration pro-
cesses underway since the end of the division
of Europe. Simultaneously, traditional military
threats against territorial integrity have contin-
ued to diminish for the large majority of states,
although the arrangements established for open-
ness in defence policies, armaments projects and
military activities and the assessment of defen-
sive-offensive capabilities remain on the secu-
rity agenda for all responsible and competent
actors.
Consequently, crisis management has
emerged as the new main focus of military co-
394
operation, but it remains part of a broader prac-
tice of cooperative security. The use of military
means by states and international institutions for
such missions as peacekeeping, peace-enforce-
ment and humanitarian intervention is embed-
ded within cooperative security management
across the entire conflict cycle that entails also
early warning and conflict prevention as well
as post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilita-
tion. Facing a growing set of tasks that may in-
clude the militarily robust separation of parties
as well as the politically sensitive cooperation
between political and military missions on the
field, defence establishments everywhere are
engaged in restructuring and reconfiguration
that may turn out to be as demanding as the
build-up effort aimed at stemming the Cold War
confrontation was in its time.
The concept and practice of military coopera-
tion extends beyond crisis management in its
varying and developing forms. Defence-related
support is provided for states that are recon-
structing, reforming and restructuring their
armed forces for tasks related to national or col-
lective defence and international responsibili-
ties by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO) in its Partnership for Peace (PfP)
programmes and Membership Action Plans
(MAP) as well as by countries in regional con-
texts such as the Baltic Security Assistance
(BALTSEA) coordinated by a number of Nor-
dic and western states. Military-to-military co-
operation is aimed at contributing to the overall
transition support for recipient states in the
value-based unification of the geopolitical space
covered by the Organisation for Cooperation and
Security in Europe (OSCE) and the enlargement
of European integration.
Finally, military cooperation is not only a chal-
lenge for transition states, it has acquired a new
urgency among the established democracies and
members of NATO and the European Union
(EU). Faced with the dynamics of high-tech-
nology at the core of the Revolution of Military
Affairs and the growing but unpredictable de-
mands for their indispensable contribution to
military crisis management, these states are
struggling to develop effective armaments co-
operation and new institutional solutions for
joint missions and to close the widening gap
between the United States and its European al-
lies and partners in the generation and
modernisation of military resources.
Explaining the new military cooperation
As an element shaping the European security
order, military cooperation is driven by a wide
range of factors that can be related to all the
principal theories or explanatory models of In-
ternational Relations.2
Primarily, military cooperation can be viewed
as another task for multilateral or inter-state
management, where institutions and regimes
serve as platforms for states cooperative efforts
based on common gains to be won in the reduc-
tion of transaction costs and improved efficiency
of outcomes. In neoliberalism, and the institu-
tionalist approach in general, military coopera-
tion is envisioned and pursued along a progres-
sive path towards such goals as stability and
democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. As
institutions and other arrangements grow and
adapt in their performance capability, security
problems are mitigated, solved and overcome
through cooperation based on common rules and
practices.
At the same time, military cooperation can be
explained in neorealist terms, as persuasion ar-
ranged, led and shaped by actors pursuing their
security interests within a recurring power struc-
ture. Institutions and other multilateral arrange-
ments reflect or reinforce power relations, no-
tably the aggregation of the military capabili-
ties of the United States and NATO, the recent
assertion of the EU onto the military-security
scene and the weakened position of Russia in
shaping and determining European security,
while actors in conflict regions remain objects
of policies.
Finally, military cooperation may be seen as
political and social construction reflecting the
significance of values and other ideational fac-
tors such as identity in international relations,
as proposed by constructivist and critical theo-
ries. Accordingly, NATO membership is not
viewed merely as a security-seeking strategy of
395
balancing against potential threats but also as a
process of self-identification and an act of be-
longing in the political and economic western
community. Likewise, the development of com-
mon security and defence policy within the EU
can be considered a natural part of comprehen-
sive and deepening integration, resulting from
the socialisation process of policy-makers and
the Europeanisation of member-states foreign
policies. 3
On the actor level, participation in military
cooperation has become indispensable for the
foreign and security policies of states  what-
ever their alignment or orientation in the Cold
War system  in transatlantic and all-European
relations. The internationalisation of the doc-
trine and practice of defence policy can be ac-
counted for as adaptation of a state towards its
security milieu. Moreover, states do not act only
on a national basis but membership of security-
related international organisations affects their
policy preferences and outcomes. A particular
challenge to the theoretical foreign policy analy-
sis is presented by the impact of membership of
the EU on foreign and security policies of states
as actors and societies (Manners/Whitman
2000).
The following analysis deals with the partici-
pation of the militarily non-allied member-states
of the EU in military cooperation in Europe and,
in particular, the implications of non-alliance for
their role in transatlantic relations. Particular
attention is devoted to Finland and Sweden,
which are presented as case studies. In conclu-
sion, references are made to the principal ex-
planatory models in assessing the impact of
military non-alliance in transatlantic relations.
2. Shaping European and transatlantic
relations
The response of the international community
to the broad scope of security challenges in the
post-cold war era has brought institutionalism
to the fore as the natural point of departure for
theoretical and analytical explanation. Security-
related international institutions are adapting to
perform their tasks in an increasingly complex
environment. Moreover, institutions are becom-
ing hybrid in order to combine different secu-
rity functions from the management of risks and
the resolution of disputes to the aggregation of
power to confront threats (Wallander/Keohane
1999).
The order of international institutions in the
security field has gone through a structural and
substantive change. While the United Nations
(UN) and the OSCE, as universal institutions,
were featured in the immediate post-Wall years
as the mandating and lead institutions for tradi-
tional peacekeeping, NATO has entered the
scene as the institution of choice for organising
and conducting what has emerged as more de-
manding and complex military crisis manage-
ment operations forced by the conflicts in the
Balkans. More recently, the European Union has
launched a process of creating a capability for
autonomous military crisis management opera-
tions, gaining a new operative dimension for the
Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP)
and supplanting the Western European Union
(WEU), which is being phased out as an active
organisation.
Among the inclusive institutions, the UN,
while remaining responsible for a collective se-
curity system, is promoting the overall frame-
work of the community of member-states for
crisis management while operations are increas-
ingly sub-contracted or delegated to regional
institutions. The OSCE is engaged primarily in
conflict prevention and civilian crisis manage-
ment while preparing a capability for military
crisis management as a regional arrangement
under the UN Charter.
Among the exclusive institutions, NATO has
transformed from a military alliance proper to a
security management institution, while main-
taining its core function of collective defence.
The EU has enlarged its operative responsibili-
ties to the area of common defence policy, leav-
ing out common defence as represented by the
mutual security guarantee of a defence alliance,
while maintaining and developing its capabili-
ties in political, economic and humanitarian as-
pects of security management. Moreover, both
NATO and the EU connect to most if not all of
the other OSCE states within a network of bi-
396
lateral and multilateral outreach arrangements.
Russia remains a special partner of both institu-
tions and their members.
As the engine of military cooperation in Eu-
rope, the transatlantic relationship is affected by
the broader context of developments in Europe
and beyond. Military cooperation has become
an arena where NATO is asserting its power in
Europe and the role of the United States is be-
ing emphasized as its leading force. At the same
time, transatlantic relations are being adjusted
to the introduction of European, global and re-
gional security issues into the bilateral relation-
ship between the United States and the EU and
to the establishment and implementation of an
EU-NATO consultation and cooperation mecha-
nism in crisis management.
The militarily non-allied members of the Eu-
ropean Union, which do not belong to NATO,
have adapted their foreign and security policies
to engage in European integration, to share in
the transatlantic link through the EU-US dia-
logue and the PfP, while maintaining the mem-
bership option, and to contribute to common
security in the OSCE space and its subregional
contexts. In all those dimensions, they have
made choices regarding military cooperation
that conform with their position on independent
or separate self-defence.
3. Post-neutrals, security, and integration
in Europe
The established neutral states (Finland, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Austria and Ireland) had
strengthened and consolidated their positions
towards the end of the Cold War as recognised
contributors to security and stability in the East-
West system (Hakovirta 1988). While provid-
ing good offices in European security and co-
operation, disarmament and peacekeeping, the
neutrals enhanced directly and indirectly their
own security. The sufficiency and credibility of
their defence was measured as their capability
to protect territorial integrity in a side theatre of
a larger conflict  not against a separate attack
by a major power  and the resources and skills
needed for international missions were limited
to traditional stationary UN peacekeeping to
which they were major contributors. Although
they considered themselves members of the
western democratic community of states by their
political and economic systems, the neutrals
were not party to the institutionalised political
or military cooperation within NATO or the
European Community (EC).
Although the neutrals continued to have a
mediating role for some time in the transition
from the Cold War to the New Europe, they
realised that peacetime neutrality defined as
impartiality in great-power conflicts had no role
any more for themselves or for European secu-
rity at large. They were engaged like any other
states in maintaining, promoting and protecting
the value-based accountability regime estab-
lished for the CSCE/OSCE area by the Paris
Charter of 1990 marking the end of the division
in Europe.4
A new challenge was presented to the secu-
rity policy adaptation of the post-neutrals by the
stepping up of NATO as a security management
institution opening towards enlargement and
cooperating with non-members and by the de-
velopment of the European Union and its com-
mon foreign and security policy, which included
defence policy aspirations and the possibility of
common defence. These developments launched
the engagement of the post-neutral states, which
were contemplating accession to the EU initially
for compelling economic reasons but also for
political and security reasons (Luif 1995), in
transatlantic politics with military implications.
As a result, the post-neutrals remained discern-
ible as a category of states in the post-division
Europe, while Central and Eastern European
states, which had but a long-term perspective
for EU membership, turned to NATO member-
ship as their immediate recipe for security con-
cerns.
Although there have been differences in the
timing and the substantive emphasis of actions,
all the cold war neutrals have embarked upon a
similar double-track policy of membership of
the EU and partnership with NATO  even Swit-
zerland, which has remained outside the EU, has
joined the PfP. In the context of accession to the
EU, Finland, Sweden and Austria confirmed
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their commitment without reservations to the
goals of the CFSP, including the provisions of
the (Maastricht) Treaty on European Union
(TEU) that refer to common defence policy and
common defence (Kuosmanen 2001, 232234).
Together with this political and legal commit-
ment, the behaviour of the former neutrals as
new members has confirmed that military non-
alliance does not restrict or limit equal and full
participation in the CFSP.
The steps of engagement in deeper security
policy cooperation have been taken by the
former neutrals within the policy of military non-
alliance, without joining NATO and without
being faced with a decision on adopting com-
mon defence as members of the EU. When sev-
eral elements in the transatlantic and Euro-At-
lantic dimensions of the international security
equation have been changing and evolving 
NATO, the PfP, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council (EAPC), the EU, the CFSP, enlargement
of NATO and enlargement of the EU  the post-
neutrals have been part of the transformation
without a particular need or pressure to align
militarily but, at the same time, without renounc-
ing such an option in either case, NATO or the
EU/CFSP.
Finland and Sweden as case studies
The relationship between military non-alli-
ance and military cooperation in the transatlan-
tic and euroatlantic contexts can be approached
through the cases of Finland and Sweden.
In a series of initiatives and representations,
Finland and Sweden have ascertained their
policy of active participation and engagement
in the development and implementation of the
security and defence dimension of the CFSP of
the European Union and the operationalisation
and application of the partnership of NATO
while reaffirming their membership option.
They confirmed their right to equal participa-
tion in all EU activities and missions as full
members, including situations in which the
Union takes recourse to the assets and capabili-
ties of the western defence alliance (the WEU,
NATO). They also asserted the need for a le-
gitimate and effective role for non-members in
preparation and decision-making on combined
operations led by NATO in the PfP framework.
And finally, Finland and Sweden have estab-
lished themselves as dialogue partners with
NATO on implications of its enlargement for
European and Northern European stability and
security as well as innovative contributors to
subregional political-military security in their
immediate environment shaped by the enlarge-
ment of the EU and NATO.5
Although slight differences remain in the ad-
justment of their foreign and security policy
doctrines from broad peacetime neutrality to the
maintenance of military non-alliance as its re-
sidual core, and in their overall strategies to-
wards the development of the Union, Finland
and Sweden have pursued an identical or simi-
lar approach to security and military coopera-
tion within the transatlantic community and to
the protection and promotion of their national
and regional security interests.6
4. Coping with NATO transformation and
enlargement
After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and
the end of the division of Europe into two op-
posing military alliances, Finland and Sweden
 like Austria and Switzerland  remained non-
allied without any compelling consideration of
an alternative defence solution. There was no
security deficit or obvious threat that should or
would be solved by accession to NATO nor was
there a need to join NATO as a confirmation of
democratic identity and transition, unlike the
Central European states, which soon took up
NATO membership as a key instrument in their
integration with the New Europe.
What emerged for Finland and Sweden was
the need to assure a proper presence in  and
influence on  decisions and arrangements that
closely affect their security and that are man-
aged primarily by NATO or within the PfP
framework as part of their broader engagement
in cooperative security in Europe. Moreover,
there remained the issue of NATO membership
as an option to be called upon in case of change
in the security situation or as a possibility to be
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upheld as the right of every state to choose or
change its security policy arrangements. Such a
two-pillar policy towards NATO has served Fin-
land and Sweden throughout the first post-Cold
War decade and into the continued transforma-
tion of Europe in the second decade.
PfP, regional security and membership
Although the first bilateral contacts with
NATO as an institutional partner were joined
with inflated public attention and political sym-
bolism, in particular Finlands observer status
with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC) in 1992, it soon became evident that
the motivating factors for the non-allied post-
neutrals in their adherence to the PfP were the
need to continue to contribute to European mili-
tary security through the emerging leading in-
stitutional arrangement (NATO/PfP) and, sec-
ondly, to gain from the practical lessons learnt
from the bilateral cooperation on defence plan-
ning with NATO (Individual Partnership
Programme; Planning and Review Process,
PARP) for the modernisation and restructuring
of their national defence forces.7
By joining the PfP and engaging in the PARP
process with an ambitious programme for pro-
moting interoperability, Finland and Sweden are
enhancing their ability to contribute further to
joint NATO-led missions with growing military
demands.
At the same time, with their experience and
tradition in UN peacekeeping and the broad
social background and professional civilian ex-
pertise of their troops recruited from the re-
serves, Finland (and Sweden) can provide a
particularly suitable input to comprehensive in-
ternational and inter-institutional missions such
as those in Bosnia and Kosovo, where they are
involved in the NATO-led SFOR and KFOR
forces.8
Finland and Sweden have been active in the
strengthening and improvement of the position
of partners in political consultation and deci-
sion-making, operational planning and com-
mand arrangements concerning their contribu-
tion to NATO-led missions. Although a guide-
lines document (the Political-Military Frame-
work, PMF) on principles and modalities for the
participation of partner countries in NATO-led
PfP operations was adopted in 1999, its imple-
mentation in the case of KFOR was not satis-
factory and the issue of legitimate access to
NATO/PfP planning structures remains on the
agenda for non-allied PfP partners.9
Finland has asserted that attaining inter-
operability and cooperating in the field with
NATO troops not only contribute to the devel-
opment of the national defence but also make
more effective the reception and use of interna-
tional assistance, which Finland can call upon
in crisis even as a UN member. One of the three
readiness brigades being developed by the Finn-
ish Defence Forces is spearheading, as NATO
interoperable, through the reinforced PfP/PARP
programme.10 Sweden has a declared goal of
making its entire defence forces interoperable
with NATO, which indirectly serves mutual co-
operation in crises affecting Sweden as well,
although it has not accentuated the reception of
assistance in defence doctrine.11 Moreover,
Sweden has a particularly active and high pro-
file as a participant and lead nation in PfP and
in the spirit of the PfP exercises in the Baltic
Sea region.
As for the NATO option in security doctrine,
Finland and Sweden maintain a similar practi-
cal argument, which states that by contributing
to stability and security in the Baltic Sea region
their military non-alliance best promotes their
national security as well under the prevailing
conditions. The stabilising role of the Finnish
and Swedish doctrines is a reference to the most
serious regional security concern, a potential
conflict involving Russia and the Baltic States,
as well as the most serious international secu-
rity concern, Russias potential reactions to
NATO enlargement up to its borders.
While Finland and Sweden demonstrate a
particular consideration of regional security is-
sues and Russias concerns, they do not restrict
their freedom of action nor do they endorse or
accept the freezing or cementing of the prevail-
ing situation in the Baltic Sea region as sepa-
rate from the overall security order in the OSCE
area. The freedom of choice principle and the
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need for flexibility remain key underlying fac-
tors in their regional security policies.
Furthermore, Finland and Sweden see them-
selves as contributors to a comprehensive pro-
cess of change that affects Northern Europe as
well as Europe as a whole. Their approach was
promoted in 1998 in a joint initiative that con-
tained an offer of additional military confidence-
and security building measures (CSBMs) with
neighbours in the region, based on the overall
OSCE regime, while rebutting Russian ideas for
a closed regional security order based on great-
power guarantees or a special position for Rus-
sia. At the same time, the Finnish-Swedish ini-
tiative endorsed regional multilateral coopera-
tion in non-military fields and the rational and
pragmatic use of European and transatlantic in-
stitutions, including the EAPC, for the promo-
tion of cooperative security in Europe through
a regional focus.
Finland states in its security and defence doc-
trine that NATO membership remains an option
although it is not on the active policy agenda.
The doctrine indicates that membership is con-
ditioned by external and internal factors that will
have to change for the membership issue to be
taken up for decision-making. Sweden does not
maintain an option as openly in its declared
doctrine and it has adhered to the formulation
where non-participation in military alliances in
peacetime aims at retaining the possibility of
neutrality in war in the vicinity. On the other
hand, in the Swedish public arena there are sig-
nificant players, such as leading news media,
experts and political parties that support or cam-
paign openly for accession to NATO. In Fin-
land there is no corresponding notable domes-
tic political pressure for membership, although
the topic comes up regularly in public discus-
sion. The public opinion is clearly against NATO
membership in both countries. 12
There is a discernible difference in the rela-
tive emphasis given to the factors of assured
influence and security guarantees as benefits
sought in possible membership of NATO. In the
Swedish debate, a widely used and key argu-
ment among proponents of membership is the
need to ensure Swedens presence in decisions
affecting its security. In Finland, the main fac-
tor in assessing the benefits of membership re-
mains the deterrent effect of the security guar-
antee and the assurance of assistance, even if
its credibility may be questioned against the les-
sons learnt from history, although the influence
argument is gaining ground in the elite discus-
sion. It is also notable that Finland puts special
emphasis on the influence argument in its EU
policy, whereas Sweden has had to maintain a
certain distance from the core of the Union due
to stronger domestic euroscepticism.
In the military threat perception, a geopoliti-
cally explainable difference comes out in the
public assessment by Sweden of the absence of
a threat of invasion for at least the next ten years
provided that other factors such as the Swedish
defence capability remain undisrupted. Al-
though there are similar trends in the Finnish
analysis, no specified assertions are made of the
existence or absence of the possibility of a large-
scale attack beyond the notion that it has been
further diminishing. Consequently, although
coming later, the restructuring planned and un-
derway in the conscription- and mobilisation-
based territorial defence system is deeper in
Sweden than in Finland. While Finland stresses
the vital significance of territorial defence as a
complement to the mobile readiness force gen-
erated for the prevention and suppression of stra-
tegic strikes as the new principal threat, Swe-
den takes up the adaptability of the defence sys-
tem and the sufficient strategic warning time in
case a restructuring back to a territorial defence
configuration were required.
Facing the issue of enlargement
While NATO membership has not emerged
as an issue requiring direct decisions by Fin-
land and Sweden, they have been faced with its
implications indirectly through the process of
NATO enlargement. The issue arose as a dis-
tinct challenge to their security policy when the
decision on the first wave of new members be-
came imminent in 19961997. In a joint memo-
randum to NATO, Finland and Sweden ex-
pressed their interests and concerns and offered
their cooperation based on NATOs commitment
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to an enlargement process that would enhance
European security at large. By engaging NATO
in a dialogue on the implications of enlargement,
Finland and Sweden established themselves as
recognized partners with legitimate concerns
and security producers. 13
As NATO was preparing a special charter ar-
rangement with Russia as an effort to acknowl-
edge Russias great-power position without giv-
ing it a veto on enlargement, a natural concern
of Finland and Sweden was to make sure that
no decisions concerning their security or their
region would be made above their heads in such
a great-power arrangement. Moreover, the ini-
tiative towards NATO signalled a permanent
interest by Finland and Sweden in safeguard-
ing their region from any undue or unreason-
able side-effects from a conflict over enlarge-
ment. At the same time, they were expressing
confidence in NATOs intentions towards over-
all European security and stressing the Baltic
States right to choose their own security policy
line. Moreover, Sweden and Finland jointly con-
ducted a parallel discussion with Russia during
the formative period connected with the first
wave of enlargement and Russias responses that
included its proposal for a closed regional se-
curity system.14
Finland and Sweden were drawn into the poli-
tics of NATO enlargement in the North also by
the active policy of the United States towards
the Baltic States and Northeastern Europe at
large. Early on in the debate, Finland and Swe-
den were presented by US analysts as key re-
gional players capable of promoting objectives
common with those of the United States and
NATO.15 Finland and Sweden supported the
transition and consolidation of the Baltic States
by political, economic as well as defence assis-
tance for the construction of their national de-
fence forces. Finland and Sweden would also
have a key role in speeding up the admittance
of the Baltic States to membership of the EU as
an alternative or complementary measure to their
potential NATO membership.
Consequently, the non-alliance of Finland and
Sweden has been a position widely supported
and accepted by the leading NATO powers as
well as Russia. As the second wave of NATO
enlargement is approaching in 2002, with a
growing possibility of a Baltic dimension,16 Fin-
land and Sweden continue to be involved in the
process as contributors and demanders. Russia
clearly expects them to adhere to the policy of
non-alliance, while the United States, as the
main protagonist and leader of the policy of
enlargement, expects Finland and Sweden to
play a continued stabilising and mitigating role
whichever way the decision might go  as con-
tributors to the continued stability and transi-
tion of the Baltic States, in case of no NATO
enlargement in the region, or possibly by join-
ing NATO as well or otherwise softening the
effect of a Baltic accession in Russias eyes.
While the Nordic members of NATO, Denmark,
Norway and Iceland, are active proponents of
Baltic membership, Finland and Sweden are
hard pressed to indicate their position beyond
merely referring to the freedom of choice prin-
ciple.
As Sweden emphatically, and also Finland,
shy away from being given any kind of a guar-
antor status vis-à-vis the security of the Baltic
States, they cannot be involved in the decision
that is to be made by the NATO members. Con-
sequently, Sweden and Finland do not give di-
rect advice on, or pretend to be able to promote
NATO membership for the Baltic States. Swe-
den seems to promote the inevitability of Baltic
membership as part of European transition.
While Finland has come to acknowledge the
increased likelihood of Baltic memberships, it
stresses its role in promoting EU enlargement
as the effective contribution to regional stabil-
ity. While emphasizing that Baltic memberships
are not against its security interests, Finland re-
frains from making concrete predictions on their
consequences to regional security.17
While the second round of NATO enlargement
seems to intensify the political linkage of the
process with the position of Finland and Swe-
den as non-allied regional players, it will also
reconfirm the difference between their policy
on NATO membership and that of the Baltic
States. At the same time, Finland and Sweden
continue to remain effective interlocutors of the
United States because of their strategic position
and policy of military non-alliance.
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Summing up
The agenda of military cooperation between
Finland and Sweden, as militarily non-allied
states, and NATO consists of three issue-areas:
practical cooperation in crisis management
within the PfP framework, dialogue on NATO
enlargement and its regional implications, and
respect for the right of choice related to the op-
tion of membership. Viewed from the Finnish
and Swedish perspectives, the relations with
NATO in each of these issue-areas are guided
and affected differently by the explanatory fac-
tors of management, power and identity (see
Figure 1).
As for the option of NATO membership, Fin-
land and Sweden have retained their freedom
of choice, while any decisions changing their
non-alliance status are influenced and shaped
by a broad spectrum of domestic, social and
political factors that make membership a broad
issue of identity construction as well. Due to
their geopolitical situation, as applicants and
invitees Finland and Sweden would be faced
with the realities of strategic power calculations
by the US and NATO at large. Institutional and
managerial arrangements would not present a
major obstacle because of their established
democratic systems and the progress in military
interoperability produced by the intensive work
within PfP cooperation and based on existing
credible national defence systems.
5. Enhancing the role of the EU in the field
of security and defence
Membership of the European Union is the
main platform for the militarily non-allied coun-
tries in their engagement in shaping political and
military security in Europe and is also their most
effective channel in influencing transatlantic
relations. Although the EU has long remained
 and still primarily is  a political, economic
and humanitarian actor, it is in the development
of the integration and common policies of the
Union where Finland and Sweden, as well as
Austria and Ireland (Keohane 2001), have been
realigning their neutrality conceptions and
adapting their foreign and security and, more
recently, also their defence doctrines.
In a broader context, changes in the security
and defence policies have been part of the over-
all adaptation process brought about by mem-
bership of the EU. In the Europeanisation of
foreign and security policy, a growing array of
assessments, decisions and actions take place
within the Union and through the CFSP mecha-
nism. For the former neutrals, past beliefs and
conceptions of neutrality form a particular area
of adaptation. Although national defence proper
 whether separate (independent) or common
defence  remains domain privé as long as an
article V commitment is not adopted as part of
the TEU, the security and defence policy of
Contributing to NATO-led military crisis man-
agement is, above all, a task of institutional
management for Finland and Sweden, which are
both contributors to and consumers of the com-
mon gains in international military cooperation.
Secondly, they have an interest in identifying
themselves with the inclusive process of PfP
cooperation that benefits the overall OSCE se-
curity space, while power affects mainly the is-
sue of non-member participation in planning and
preparation of NATO-led missions.
In enlargement, Finland and Sweden are faced
with an outcome of the power structure, which
they can influence only marginally. At the same
time, they can contribute to the broader man-
agement of regional security and stability by
assistance and support for the Baltic States and
by promoting PfP-related activity in the region.
Finally, Finland and Sweden do not see them-
selves in the same group as transition countries
seeking NATO membership.




MANAGEMENT 1 2 3
POWER 3 1 2
IDENTITY 2 3 1
Note: Rank order of factors guiding and affecting the relations
of Finland and Sweden as non-allied states with NATO over
the main three issue-areas.
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members remains under the influence of sev-
eral other factors.
Finland and Sweden stress the role of the EU
as an amplifier of their influence in international
affairs and, more indirectly, as a contributor to
their security. Consequently, they are willing and
prepared to contribute to strengthening the effi-
ciency of the CFSP both institutionally and in
joint outcomes.
The Finnish-Swedish initiative of 1996 on
introducing the security and defence dimension
as a practical and concrete common policy into
what became the Amsterdam Treaty was aimed
at strengthening the capability of the Union in
international security beyond its previous role
in political and economic matters. The initia-
tive had three main objectives, namely, intro-
ducing the Petersberg tasks as membership ob-
ligations, strengthening the operative link be-
tween the EU and the WEU in conducting such
operations, and securing for the militarily non-
allied members a position on equal footing in
planning and decision-making related to such
EU-led operations.18
At the same time, the Finnish-Swedish initia-
tive guided the work towards military crisis
management  and armaments cooperation  as
the operative substance of common defence
policy and kept out the issue of common de-
fence, which was promoted in the competing
proposal by Germany and France on the step-
by-step integration of the WEU into the EU.
There was no consensus for the introduction of
common defence and the Finnish-Swedish ini-
tiative was effectively adopted at Amsterdam,
while common defence was reaffirmed as a pos-
sible finalité goal requiring a unanimous deci-
sion. The outcome confirmed the assessment
made by the new members that their specific
position in the defence area would not limit their
participation or influence in the CFSP.
As the next step was taken by the EU after
the 1998 St. Malo initiative of France and the
UK, followed by consecutive decisions in the
Cologne and Helsinki summits of 1999, there
was no difficulty for Finland and Sweden to
support, and actively shape, the further devel-
opment of the common security and defence
policy.
The European Security and Defence Policy
(ESDP) has not included or activated the dis-
cussion on a common defence commitment but
has retained the concept of the Petersberg tasks
as the operative focus. As for the transfer of
certain functions and bodies from the WEU to
the EU, the Finnish-Swedish approach even
prior to Amsterdam was to stress the role of the
Union as the institution making the decisions
and taking the political responsibility in the con-
duct of European operations. The EU-WEU
model was never tested and remained too com-
plicated to work. The decision to make the EU
the institution that would not only plan and de-
cide upon but also conduct European military
crisis management operations conformed with
the CFSP philosophy of Finland and Sweden.
Moreover, the ESDP strengthened their equal
position as full members of the Union through-
out the process of crisis management, as the
complicated arrangements within the WEU
framework were replaced.
Consequently, Finland played a major role
during its Presidency in the negotiations on the
headline goal and the principles, institutions and
mechanisms of the ESDP that were adopted at
the Helsinki Summit of 1999. During its Presi-
dency in the first half of 2001, Sweden pursued
an active role in the implementation of the de-
cisions adopted at the Nice European Council
towards making the ESDP operational by the
end of 2001 and finalising the institutional ar-
rangements with NATO and third countries. The
Chief of Finnish Defence, General Gustav
Hägglund, was selected by his peers as the first
Chairman of the EU Military Committee. Ear-
lier in 1998, Austria had been active in prepar-
ing the operationalisation of the defence dimen-
sion by inviting the defence ministers to a first
unofficial meeting, thus initiating the practice
of having defence ministers join foreign minis-
ters at the Council or meet separately when is-
sues to be discussed call for their expertise.
A further joint initiative by Finland and Swe-
den, in 2000, pushed forward the strengthening
of the capability of the EU in civilian crisis
management as an integral and complementary
part of the reform of the CFSP that was launched
by the new phase in the development of the com-
403
mon security and defence policy.19 Broad con-
sensus has emerged in support of steps towards
operationalising the EU capability in the field,
starting with policing, as it had become clear
that the civilian component was not aimed at
interfering with the development of the head-
line goal but at complementing the overall ca-
pability of the Union in crisis management.
The impact of membership of the EU in the
adaptation of the foreign and security policies
of such non-allied members as Finland and
Sweden is of particular complexity in the area
of security and defence. On one hand, national
defence is kept outside the Union acquis and
special attention is required in the development
of the EU-NATO relationship. On the other
hand, both countries are engaged fully in the
CFSP and the ESDP to augment the impact of
their national policies and to promote common
values and objectives. Participating in common
policies of a global player, they are exposed to
the socialisation and Europeanisation process,
which is enlarging the scope and weight of is-
sues being worked through the CFSP mecha-
nism. The CFSP is not only a complement to
national policy; it is also a factor that develops
national foreign and security policy.
Implications of the ESDP for transatlantic
relations
Coming from the tradition and practice of
neutrality, and the northern European strategic
environment with its sensitivities to great-power
politics, Finland and Sweden are not natural
adherents of either Europeanist or Atlanticist
schools as developed in the European Commu-
nity/Union over decades. For Finland and Swe-
den, the EU can be an avenue that combines
and satisfies both orientations in a balanced
manner. For geopolitical reasons they consider
the US presence in Europe important while
viewing the EU as their main instrument in pro-
moting values and policy preferences based on
common European history and identity. More-
over, Sweden and Finland are active and suc-
cessful proponents of multilateral cooperation
within the UN and the OSCE, which may influ-
ence their views of the objectives of the ESDP
and the mandate issue of humanitarian interven-
tions and EU-led operations.
The implications of the European Security and
Defence Policy for security relations between
the EU and the United States can be viewed from
the perspective of the change launched in the
Union by the ESDP, and the consequent re-
sponse by the US, and the adaptation of NATO
to the emergence of a new institutional player
in military security management and defence
policy developments in Europe.
On the basis of this approach, an analysis20
can be conducted around three concepts deter-
mining the impact of the ESDP on the role of
the EU in international security management:
● competence: determining such items as pur-
pose, power as decision-making, and au-
tonomy;
● capability: performance, institutions, input
and output contributions;
● authority: power as prestige and leadership
in governance; and order, influence and iden-
tity.
In these three dimensions, developments mea-
sure the autonomy of the EU in military crisis
management and its linkage with the US/NATO
as factors that constrain, guide and adapt the
development and implementation of the ESDP.
The degree of autonomy-linkage can be
analysed against the preconditions set by the US
for the effects of the ESDP on NATO and the
transatlantic security link: decoupling-indivis-
ibility; duplication-improvement; discrimina-
tion-inclusiveness.21
The ESDP is not so much about the relation-
ship between the EU and NATO as it is about
the relationship between the EU and the US. The
political, institutional and practical as well as
military factors behind the EUs drive in fram-
ing the defence aspects of the CFSP will shape
the EU-US relationship.
The political factor is derived from the inter-
nal political dynamics of the Union, which are
affected by ideational and power relations
among members plus their perceptions of the
objectives and direction that the common poli-
cies of the Union should pursue. The relation-
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ship between the Europeanist and Atlanticist
schools of transatlantic relations is a case in
point.
The institutional factor is linked with the in-
ternal dynamics of the integration process. It is
theoretical or ideological by nature in stressing
the inevitability of the development of the Union
towards a finalité goal that includes common
defence. The theoretical-ideological approach
stresses the integrity of the institutional struc-
ture of the Union and its internal rules of the
game.
The practical factor is based on a pragmatic
approach to the external challenges facing the
Union. The response should be designed and
measured according to the tasks at hand and the
Union should be open to cooperation and part-
nership with other institutional players. There
is less concern about the self-value of the Union,
its institutions and separate objectives.
The military factor would be related to the
protection of the territorial integrity of the Union
and its members. It would become a motivating
factor in case the members were to perceive an
external threat and a security deficit. Such a situ-
ation would arise, for example, if NATO were
to be dissolved or otherwise lose its credibility
as a collective defence arrangement for mem-
bers and non-allied members would lose confi-
dence in their separate national defence.
In the broader context, the prospect of diver-
gence vs. convergence between the EU and the
US in their grand strategies of geopolitics, doc-
trine and military technology is emerging as a
factor framing the evolution of the ESDP in US-
EU relations. It is shaped by such issues as mis-
sile defence and international terrorism. The
question asked is whether the security policy
relationship between the European Union and
the United States is being based on a division
of labour or partnership or possibly in their com-
bination.22
The competence of the EU in military crisis
management remains based on the fundamen-
tal principle of autonomy in decision-making,
emphasizing the theoretical or ideological mo-
tivation and the perception of the ESDP/CFSP
as a step in the historical development of EU
integration. The political motivation shapes the
degree of accommodation and competition in
defining NATO as the institution of first choice
in military crisis management. As states ben-
efiting particularly from membership, Finland
and Sweden are strong proponents of its deci-
sion-making autonomy and the cohesion and
integrity of the unified institutional structure.
The competence, as tasks assigned by the EU
for the ESDP, can be read in treaty-making, ca-
pabilities devoted to and strategies defined or
scenarios assumed for EU-led missions. Al-
though competence defined as tasks is an open-
ended category, the formal and institutional limi-
tations, reinforced by real and pragmatic poli-
tics, profile the Union as a junior partner to
NATO in military crisis management. With ac-
tive participation in the PfP, Finland and Swe-
den have no interest in duplicating efforts in
resource generation and maintain a pragmatic
approach to NATOs leading role.
The generation of an EU capability for au-
tonomous action in military crisis management,
as envisaged in the decisions of the Union on
resources assigned for the rapid reaction force
and the institutional reform carried out in the
Council structure for the political control and
strategic direction of EU-led operations, will
measure the political-military credibility of the
ESDP and its significance for European secu-
rity. In this context, the US is driving the dis-
cussion on the need for high-technology based
defence reforms and armaments cooperation and
integration.
The added value brought by the ESDP to the
aggregate capabilities, primarily existing
through NATO and its Partnership for Peace,
for military crisis management in Europe will
arise from the forces and collective capabilities
developed, the enhanced institutional capabil-
ity and new strategic culture created for dealing
with political-military issues, the public and
parliamentary support that is envisaged and also
the intensified work on the capability for civil-
ian crisis management, which further strength-
ens the EUs position as a comprehensive player
in stability and security promotion. As a dis-
tinct security entity, the EU is seen as perform-
ing military missions of less than maximum ur-
gency.
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The willingness to assign credible resources
for EU-led missions is driven largely by prag-
matic motivations, as there are no immediate or
direct needs for military security of the EU or
its members beyond the existing defence ar-
rangements within NATO or separately outside
the EU framework. Finland and Sweden are
leading proponents of the pragmatic approach,
which measures the need for an EU crisis man-
agement capability, augmented by an access to
NATO resources, as a response to challenges in
the European security environment.
The question of improvement in the genera-
tion of capabilities by the ESDP is centred on
military planning. The implications of the ESDP
for the regime of military crisis management are
determined and controlled by the institutional
relationships being established between the EU
and NATO in strategic planning, force planning
and operational planning.
The autonomy and identity of the EU are most
effectively challenged by the US/NATO prepon-
derance in planning. For the EU to maintain its
decision-making autonomy over the whole pro-
cess of an operation, a degree of autonomous
planning is required. The relationship between
EU planning and NATO defence planning re-
mained open after the Nice/Brussels meetings
in December 2000 and lingered on beyond the
2001 Gothenburg summit.
In strategic planning, NATO will perform an
advisory and supporting role; in operational
planning NATOs integrated structure SHAPE
will have the primary role as requested by the
EU in each case. It is in force planning where
most of the ambiguity exists and where the ca-
pacity of NATO is most critically guiding, aug-
menting and controlling the EU planning pro-
cess.
Although pragmatic motivations prevail in the
issue of planning as part of capabilities genera-
tion, ideological values of integration are
touched upon as well, due to the need to assure
the decision-making autonomy and identity of
the Union. Moreover, the need to distinguish
the alternative option of an autonomous EU-led
operation without recourse to NATO assets, in
particular by France, is based on political moti-
vations. The militarily non-allied members have
a pragmatic interest in building upon their work
within the PfP/PARP as they prepare further
their forces earmarked for EU-led operations
under the headline goal.
As the EU is becoming operational in crisis
management, initially during 2001, and finally
in 2003, the ESDP will expand the authority of
the Union in military security, reinforcing its
established position in comprehensive security.
At the same time, it is evident that NATO will
remain the institution of choice for the most
demanding cooperative military crisis manage-
ment operations in Europe and the role of NATO
will be emphasized increasingly as the primary
platform and instrument of US security policy
in Europe.
The development of the ESDP will enhance
the hybridisation of the Union toward an inter-
national institution that covers all the sectors of
security, excluding common defence proper but
involving international military cooperation.
The common security and defence policy of the
EU remains initially European in its scope,
complementing the global dimension of its po-
litical and economic role. As the USs military
security interests and capabilities are inherently
global, complementing its global political and
economic role, the relationship between the EU
and the US will become increasingly complex
in scope and substance.
For associated candidate states the ESDP has
become an additional membership requirement.
In EU-Russian relations, the ESDP has opened
a new issue-area with a potential significance
for the formation of the security order. The EU,
governed by its common strategy and Northern
Dimension, will assume increased significance
as the overall partner of Russia in shaping Eu-
ropean stability, security and unification and
determining the lines of division in the Euro-
pean order. Finland and Sweden are closely in-
volved in the EU-Russian cooperation.
Political motivations enhanced by ideologi-
cal factors come to the fore in the issue of au-
thority between the EU and the United States in
international relations. Ultimately, this empha-
sis is true for Sweden and Finland as well, as
European and American objectives and grand
strategies continue to diverge under the global
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security change. In determining its cooperative
relations in military crisis management with
third countries in Europe, the EU is asserting
its comprehensive strategy for engagement and
unification, addressing also the specific cases
of Turkey and Russia. For the non-allied mem-
bers, it is vital to benefit fully from their status
as members of the Union, while they continue
to adapt to the position of non-members of
NATO in the PfP. In global security issues out-
side Europe, differences of approach between
the EU and the United States reinforce the com-
mon profile of the EU.
Summing up
The profile of non-allied members of the EU,
such as Finland and Sweden, in their policies
towards transatlantic relations in the ESDP con-
text is shaped by a combination of institutional,
pragmatic and political motivations and incen-
tives (see Figure 2).
link to maximum effect in supporting the de-
velopment of the military resources of the Union
and underpinning its missions. Here also, they
would be keen on protecting the autonomy of
the Union in the issue concerning the review of
force planning, although they do not feel a need
for NATO or the United States to be challenged
politically as the leading players in military se-
curity.
Faced with the broader issue of authority in
international relations, Finland and Sweden take
a political approach connected with European
ideas, values and traditions. Their past experi-
ence as small states or their non-aligned status
does not bring them closer than other EU mem-
bers to the US policies in global or regional se-
curity issues. On the other hand, Finland and
Sweden would not perceive the Union neces-
sarily as a global power in the same category as
the United States but take a pragmatic and co-
operative line when one is called for; and they
value the stabilising role of the US in the north-
ern European region.
The military factor is not an active consider-
ation for Finland and Sweden as long as com-
mon defence is effectively off the agenda of the
ESDP.23
In this tentative analysis, the profile of Fin-
land and Sweden in the ESDP is placed in the
mainstream of the European Union. Being par-
ticular about the autonomy of the Union, prag-
matic in EU-NATO cooperation on generating
military resources, and political towards global
security issues in the EU-US dialogue, Finland
and Sweden contribute to the shaping of trans-
atlantic relations in the field of military coop-
eration as effective players among the EU mem-
bers. As long as common defence remains out-
side the effective development of the ESDP, the
policy of military non-alliance is but one and
not necessarily a decisive factor in shaping their
role in political-military transatlantic relations.
6. Conclusions
Despite the dominant position of NATO in the
military politics of European security, militar-
ily non-allied members of the European Union
Figure 2. The profile of Finland and Sweden in
transatlantic military issues
COMPETENCE CAPABILITY AUTHORITY
INSTITUTIONAL 1 2 3
PRACTICAL 3 1 2
POLITICAL 2 3 1
MILITARY 4 4 4
Note: Rank order of motivations driving their policies and po-
sitions on the competence, capability and authority of the EU
in the development of the ESDP and in the relationship with
the US/NATO.
In protecting and strengthening the compe-
tence of the Union, its decision-making au-
tonomy and unified institutional structure, Fin-
land and Sweden are driven, first of all, by the
theoretical or ideological factor. They do not shy
away from the long-term goals or ideals of the
Union, although they do not encourage efforts
to define them in any binding manner. Political
and pragmatic factors would follow in that or-
der.
In addressing the issue of the capability of the
Union in military crisis management, Finland
and Sweden primarily take a pragmatic ap-
proach. They are willing to use the EU-NATO
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are competent and effective players in military
aspects of transatlantic relations and European
security at large.
The role of non-allied states is evolving in the
context of change in both of the principal secu-
rity institutions, NATO and the European Union,
and in the transformation in the subject matter
and practice of military cooperation. The en-
gagement and impact of Finland and Sweden
reflect the explanatory power of the institution-
alist model in an international order where play-
ers are searching for new and pragmatic solu-
tions to common problems and challenges.
The contribution of Finland and Sweden to
shaping the common security and defence policy
of the EU demonstrates the dynamics and lim-
its of adaptation as a source and cause of for-
eign policy change. Finland and Sweden have
developed their participation in military and
defence cooperation but kept the change within
the limits of military non-alliance in accordance
with their national objectives.
In the future, the ESDP will become more
effective as a tool with which Finland and Swe-
den will be able to influence transatlantic rela-
tions and even contribute to change in power
relations. Moreover, the constructivist model
guides their orientation towards a more
Europeanised or EU-channelled security and
defence policy. At the same time, the realist
forces place the non-allied states in a position
of choice on the diverging paths between the
EU and the United States and continue to affect
their immediate security environment in a criti-
cal manner.
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the OSCE Code of Conduct on politico-military as-
pects of security, held in 1997 and 1999. While the
previous forum brings together all the states of the
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and Swedens foreign and security policy lines to EU
membership and the development of the common
security and defence policy is Ojanen et al. (2000),
see also Herolf (1999) and Miles (2000). On the point
that the firewall established by the assessment and
calculation that the EU would not proceed to adopt
common defence has been standing erect, providing
Finland and Sweden with flexibility in their activity
on the issue-area, see Möttölä (2001a).
19 The Finnish-Swedish initiative was taken after the
Helsinki Summit. Sweden had been a vocal propo-
nent of civilian crisis management from the begin-
ning. Moreover, at Swedens initiative, an EU
Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts
was adopted by the Gothenburg Summit, stressing
the importance of conflict prevention in the EUs role.
20 This analysis is based on the ISA paper by Möttölä
(2001b); for prospects of EU-NATO relations in cri-
sis management, see Gärtner (2001). For recent re-
ports and studies on the ESDP and the EU-US rela-
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tions, see Andréani et al. (2001), Heisbourg (2000),
Howorth (2000). Key documents related to the ESDP
are: Joint declaration on European defence, Franco-
British Summit, St. Malo, 4 December 1998; Euro-
pean Council Declaration on strengthening the com-
mon European policy on security and defence, Presi-
dency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3
and 4 June 1999; Presidency progress report to the
Helsinki European Council on strengthening the com-
mon European policy on security and defence, Presi-
dency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10
and 11 December 1999; Presidency report on the Eu-
ropean security and defence policy, Presidency Con-
clusions, Nice European Council, 7 and 8 December
2000; Presidency Conclusions, Gothenburg European
Council, 15-16 June 2001.
21 The three Ds were modified by NATO Secretary
General into three Is with a positive connotation;
see Sloan (2000).
22 Implications of the widening military gap between
the US and Europe are assessed in Gompert et al.
(1999).
23 While in Austria a mutual EU security guarantee is
debated as an alternative in future security solutions.
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